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• This paper analyses optimal taxation with and without commitment in an environ-
ment where all tax instruments are distortionary within the period, due to endoge-
nous labour supply, variable capital utilisation, and non-tax-deductible deprecia-
tion.
• The novelty of the paper is allowing for consumption taxation.
• Ramsey and Markov-perfect policies are close to identical with consumption taxa-
tion, while they differ substantially with only factor income taxation.
• The value of commitment is negligible with consumption taxation and substantial





















We characterise optimal tax policies when the government has access to consumption
taxation and cannot credibly commit to future policies. We consider a neoclassical econ-
omy where factor income taxation is distortionary within the period, due to endogenous
labour and capital utilisation and non-tax-deductibility of depreciation. Contrary to the
case where only labour and capital income are taxed, the optimal time-consistent poli-
cies with consumption taxation are remarkably similar to their Ramsey counterparts. The
welfare gains from commitment are negligible, while they are substantial without con-
sumption taxation. Further, the welfare gains from taxing consumption are much higher
without commitment.
JEL classification: E62, H21.
Keywords: fiscal policy, Markov-perfect policies, consumption taxation, variable capital
utilisation
IWe thank the editor Ricardo Reis and anonymous referees, as well as Charles Brendon, Davide Debor-
toli, Andrea Lanteri, Campbell Leith, Yang K. Lu, Albert Marcet, Ricardo Nunes, Evi Pappa, Vito Polito, José
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Most of the literature on optimal fiscal policy rules out consumption taxation, a policy
instrument used in most industrialised economies. For example, as of early 2019, the
value-added tax (VAT) on standard items ranges from 17 to 27 percent in European Union
countries. The literature on optimal consumption taxation includes Coleman (2000), who5
finds, under the assumption that the fiscal authority can commit to future policies, that
replacing income taxes with consumption taxes would lead to large welfare gains in the
United States. Correia (2010) extends this result to a heterogeneous-agents framework.
Two recent contributions highlight the role of consumption taxation as a tool to relax a
constraint of the monetary authority on the nominal interest rate, either as a result of10
the zero lower bound (Correia et al., 2013) or in a monetary union (Farhi et al., 2014).
Our study finds a new benefit of consumption taxation: time-consistent policies and the
resulting allocations are almost identical to those under commitment.
Our results are derived in a neoclassical model with endogenous labour supply and
variable capital utilisation. The government has to finance spending on public goods and15
has access to three types of proportional taxes: capital income, labour income, and con-
sumption taxes. A key element of our baseline environment is that all tax instruments
are distortionary within the period. Given endogenous labour, both the consumption tax
and the labour tax affect the consumption-leisure choice of households. Given endoge-
nous capital utilisation and that depreciation is not tax-deductible, the capital tax distorts20
the capital utilisation rate. Lump-sum taxes and debt (or asset) accumulation are not
available to the government. Under these assumptions there is no trivial solution to the
problem of raising fiscal revenues.
Our key assumptions resulting in a distortionary capital tax within the period are mo-
tivated by the facts that in practice (i) capital utilisation is not fixed, and (ii) depreciation is25
deductible according to accounting formulae and is not based on the actual loss of value
in capital due to usage. Hence, capital taxes introduce a wedge between the return on
capital services and their cost in terms of capital depreciation.
The novelty of our paper lies in analysing time-consistent fiscal policies when the













The existing literature on Markov-perfect policies, starting with the seminal paper Klein
et al. (2008), finds that lack of commitment alters greatly the characteristics of optimal
policies and the resulting allocations when capital and/or labour income are taxed. The
closest contributions to our study are Martin (2010) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010).
These papers consider the same economic environment as we do, and find that with-35
out commitment factor income tax rates at the steady state are close to those in the United
States.
Our results can be summarised as follows. First, if the policy-maker has access to
all three types of taxes and the tax rates are unrestricted, the first-best allocation can be
implemented at the steady state under commitment. Optimal taxation involves no tax40
on capital and taxing consumption and subsidising labour at the same rate, as long as
private consumption is larger than labour income. The result comes from the fact that
any constant consumption tax rate is non-distortionary with respect to the household’s
consumption-saving decision. Given that Ramsey policies achieve the first best, they are
time-consistent. In other words, the steady states under Ramsey and Markov-perfect45
policy-making coincide. However, these tax policies include an unrealistically large (sev-
eral hundred percent) labour subsidy.
Second, we study the case where subsidising labour is prohibited, as in Coleman
(2000). In this case, the labour income tax is zero. The Ramsey (Markov) policy-maker
taxes consumption at 22.3 (22.1) percent at the steady state in our baseline calibration, and50
sets the capital income tax to zero (0.4 percent). Looking at the transition from the status
quo, optimal consumption and capital tax rates vary little over time and with the level of
capital, under both Ramsey and Markov policy-making.
Third, for comparison, we also analyse the case with only factor income taxation. In
this case the capital income tax is 19.8 percent at the Markov steady state. Ramsey and55
Markov policies and allocations are not similar.
In terms of welfare-equivalent consumption, the gains from commitment are negligi-
ble with consumption taxation (0.0003 percent), while they are substantial (2.01 percent)
without. The welfare gains from taxing consumption are 2.77 (1.21) percent in the case of













larger welfare gains under discretion than under commitment. With consumption taxa-
tion the welfare gains over the existing tax system in the United States are 7.745 (7.744)
percent under Ramsey (Markov) policies, while without taxing consumption the gains are
7.06 (4.92) percent. Remarkably, we find higher welfare under discretion when the policy-
maker has access to consumption taxation than under commitment when the government65
can tax only labour and capital income.
Finally, we analyse policies over the business cycle when the economy is hit by aggre-
gate productivity shocks. We find that with access to consumption taxation also the cycli-
cal properties of tax rates and allocations under a Ramsey and a time-consistent policy-
maker are very similar.70
The intuition behind these results is the following. Firstly, at the steady state, taxing
consumption causes only intratemporal distortion, while taxing capital income causes
intertemporal distortion as well, i.e., goods of different time periods are taxed differ-
ently, which is to be avoided by the principles of optimal commodity taxation (Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1972). At the Markov equilibrium and in the initial periods under commit-75
ment, the policy-maker optimally taxes already installed capital as much as possible, as
it is viewed as a non-distortionary source of revenue. In our environment, firstly, our
balanced-budget requirement limits the initial capital levy. Secondly and most impor-
tantly, the capital income tax distorts capital utilisation. With only factor income taxation,
the Markov policy-maker’s desire to tax ‘initial’ capital still dominates, and hence there80
are large differences in policies and allocations between Ramsey and Markov govern-
ments.
On the contrary, taxing consumption partly taxes the initial capital stock, akin to the
capital tax and as opposed to the labour tax. Further, a flat consumption tax does not
distort intertemporal decisions at all, while the capital tax of all periods except the initial85
one does. An additional trade-off the government faces is in terms of intratemporal dis-
tortions: the capital tax impacts the capital utilisation margin, while the consumption tax
distorts the consumption-leisure margin. The latter distortion turns out to be the least im-
portant quantitatively in determining optimal policy, while the intratemporal distortion













Our main result that with consumption taxation Ramsey and Markov-perfect policies
and allocations are almost identical is robust to modifying various parameter values1 and
assuming that government spending is exogenous rather than endogenous. Our results
are much weakened if the capital income tax rate is non-distortionary within the period.
This happens if depreciation is tax-deductible and/or capital is fully utilised. The gains95
from commitment with consumption taxation increase to between 0.388 and 0.633 percent
and the capital tax rate is not close to zero (10.3 to 23.6 percent) at the Markov steady
state. Our results reinforce the conclusions of Zhu (1995) on the importance of the capital
utilisation margin when studying optimal taxation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the economic environ-100
ment. Section 3 sets up the fiscal policy problems, both (i) the Ramsey problem and (ii)
the problem of a time-consistent policy-maker. Afterwards, it characterises the equilibria
and presents some analytical results. Section 4 contains our quantitative results. Section 5
scrutinises the role of our key assumptions. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model105
The economy is populated by a representative household, a representative firm, and a
utilitarian policy-maker. The household decides on consumption, saving, leisure, and the
capital utilisation rate. The firm operates in perfectly competitive markets, maximises
profits, and uses capital services and labour as production inputs. The policy-maker
spends on public consumption which yields utility to households, and raises revenues110
via proportional taxes on labour income, capital income, and consumption. Deprecia-
tion, which depends on the capital utilisation rate, is not tax-deductible. Lump-sum taxes
are not available, and the government has to balance its budget in each period. Time is
discrete.
A few comments are in order about our main assumptions before describing the eco-115
nomic environment in mathematical terms. First, endogenous capital utilisation (see
Greenwood et al., 1988, Greenwood et al., 2000, and many others) and non-tax-deductible
1In particular (i) the coefficient of relative risk aversion for private consumption, (ii) the Frisch elas-
ticity of labour supply, (iii) the weight of government spending, (iv) the discount factor, and (v) how the













depreciation imply that taxing capital is distortionary within the period. Zhu (1995) was
the the first to argue that variable capital utilisation should be taken into account when
analysing optimal fiscal policy. Variable capital utilisation is in line with the fact that120
capital is not fully utilised in reality and is a standard assumption in bigger Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Further, in reality depreciation which is
tax-deductible does not depend on the actual capital utilisation rate, instead it is given
by accounting rules. These assumptions are crucial. To highlight their role, we solve our
model under alternative assumptions as well. In particular, we assume that deprecia-125
tion is tax-deductible and/or capital is fully utilised, so that the capital tax is no longer
distortionary within the period. See Section 5 and Appendix C.
Second, we assume that the government operates under a balanced-budget rule. We
do this for two main reasons. First, we wish to compare our findings with previous
studies on time-consistent fiscal policies with capital accumulation, which also impose130
a balanced-budget requirement (Klein and Rı́os-Rull, 2003; Ortigueira, 2006; Klein et al.,
2008; Azzimonti et al., 2009; Martin, 2010; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010). Second, while De-
bortoli and Nunes (2013) and Debortoli et al. (2017)) allow for debt in a Markov-perfect
policy setting, they exclude capital. We leave the study of Markov-perfect policies in an
environment with both capital and government debt to future work, and focus on the135
trade-offs between distortions generated by different tax instruments with and without
commitment in this paper. The seminal paper of Coleman (2000) on Ramsey policies with
consumption taxation does not impose a balanced-budget requirement, and imposes up-
per bounds on the tax rates instead. In Section 5.4 we compare are results to his, in order
to highlight the role our balanced-budget requirement plays.140
Finally, we consider government spending to be a choice variable of the fiscal author-
ity, following the literature on Markov-perfect policies (e.g., Klein et al., 2008). At least
part of government consumption can be adjusted in response to changes in the economy,
and we are interested in studying the optimal policy mix both on the revenue and the
spending side. We have repeated our analysis with exogenous government spending as145
a robustness check, and the results are unaltered, see Section 4.3.3.













denote the history of aggregate productivity realisations. The representative household




























































































































represents the depreciation rate of capital as a






















are the interest rate and the wage rate, respectively, and
represent the remuneration of production factors, namely, capital services and labour.
The utility function u () is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in all three of
its arguments with partial derivatives uc > 0, ucc < 0, u` > 0, u`` < 0, ug > 0, ugg < 0,
where ux and uxx denote, respectively, the first and the second derivative of the utility155
function with respect to the variable x.
Combining the first-order conditions with respect to consumption and leisure when





















































































The optimal rate of capital utilisation is where the marginal benefit from utilising more
capital in terms of after-tax income equals its marginal cost in terms of higher deprecia-
tion. Equation (6) implies that capital income taxation is distortionary within the period.
Examining the household’s first-order conditions, the different distortions caused by160
the three tax instruments become apparent. The labour income tax distorts the (intratem-
poral) consumption-leisure margin, (4). The current consumption tax distorts the same
margin. In addition, both the current and next period’s consumption tax enters into the
current (forward-looking) Euler equation, (5). Finally, only next period’s capital income
tax distorts the current Euler equation, but the current capital income tax impacts the (in-165
tratemporal) capital utilisation margin, (6). The task of the fiscal authority is to find the
optimal tax mix to raise revenue given these distortions.
We assume that the representative firm’s technology is of the standard Cobb-Douglas
















































where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the capital-services elasticity of output. Denoting by fx the




















































i.e., factor prices equal their marginal products.













































































The benchmark first-best equilibrium in our environment can be defined as follows.






























t=1 that maximise (1) subject to the house-





and the productivity process given.
The characterisation of the first best is presented in Appendix A.1.
We can define competitive equilibria as follows.175

























































(i) private sector optimisation taking government policies and prices as given, that is,
- the household’s time constraint, (2), budget constraint, (3), and optimality conditions,180
(4), (5), and (6),
- the production function, (7), and the firm’s optimality conditions, (8) and (9);
(ii) market clearing, (10), and


















3. The policy problems
Both with and without commitment, the policy-maker maximises the household’s life-
time utility over competitive equilibria. We assume, following most of the literature, that
the policy-maker moves first in each period. We use a version of the primal approach,
i.e., we write the policy problems in terms of allocations and substitute for prices and tax190
rates. We also substitute for output to simplify. However, we keep the consumption tax
rate as a decision variable along with the allocations. This will be useful when constrain-
ing the tax rates.













three equations, (7), (8), and (9), in the definition of competitive equilibria, Definition 2.
Second, the government’s budget constraint and the resource constraint jointly imply
that the household’s budget constraint, (3), holds. Then six conditions are left which
characterise competitive equilibria. Third, one can use the household’s consumption-
leisure optimality condition and the government’s budget constraint to express the labour
and capital income tax rates. The details of these derivations are in Appendix A.2. Then


































































































































v (at) k (at−1)
. (14)
So far we have not imposed any restrictions on the tax rates. We are also interested













reia (2010), given that in reality a labour subsidy is not observed at the aggregate level.
Further, a (large) subsidy would likely lead to misreporting of hours, and verification of

























Below we write the policy problems in a general form including the constraint (15). We





= 0, ∀at, to compare our results with the existing literature.
3.1. The Ramsey policy-maker’s problem

































t=0, subject to (2), (12), (13),













to the five constraints, respectively.
Note that we have assumed from the beginning that the time constraint, (2), and the
resource constraint, (12), will bind. Furthermore, note that future decision variables en-
ter into the household’s current Euler equation, (13). This latter feature implies that the
Ramsey problem is not recursive using only the natural state variables, a and k. Fol-205









= 0, can be introduced as a co-state variable to write a Bellman equa-
tion. The Ramsey problem can then be solved numerically by standard policy function
iteration. The value function and the policy functions are time-invariant on the extended
state space, the current value of which is denoted (a, k, λ3). Next period’s productivity a′210
is given exogenously. The policy-maker chooses the functions K′() and Λ′3(), as well the
policy functions for the control variables, i.e., T c(), C(), L (), H(), G(), V(), Λ′1(), Λ′2(),
Λ′4(), and Λ
′
5(), and the value functionW().
Let unindexed variables denote the values of the policy functions for the control vari-
ables at this state, i.e., c = C (a, k, λ3), and so on; and k′ = K′ (a, k, λ3), λ′3 = Λ′3 (a, k, λ3),














Z ≡ −λ1 (`+ h− 1)− λ2
[




































































λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness conditions. Appendix A.3 presents the first-order
conditions of the Ramsey policy-maker’s problem.215
3.2. The time-consistent policy-maker’s problem
To characterise optimal time-consistent policies, it is convenient to assume that there
is an infinite sequence of separate policy-makers, one for each period. The optimal policy
problem therefore resembles a dynamic game between the private sector and all succes-
sive governments. The current policy-maker seeks to maximise social welfare from today220
onwards, anticipating how future policies depend on current policies via the inherited
state variables. It also takes into account the optimising behaviour of the private sec-
tor. Note that, as under Ramsey policy-making, the fiscal authority moves first in every
period, and commits within the period.
Without commitment, strategies for government spending and tax rates depend only225
on the current natural state of the economy, (a, k). We restrict our attention to stationary
Markov-perfect equilibria of the policy game, following the literature (Klein et al., 2008).
In a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium, all governments employ the same policy
rules. Hence, the rules must satisfy a fixed-point property: if the current policy-maker an-
ticipates that all future governments will follow the policy rules230
{T c (a, k) , C (a, k) , L (a, k) ,H (a, k) ,G (a, k) ,V (a, k) ,K′ (a, k)}, and similar rules for the
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λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness condition. Appendix A.4 presents the first-order
conditions of the time-consistent policy-maker’s problem.
3.3. Analytical results235
We present analytical results for the steady state (i) in the case where tax rates are
unrestricted and (ii) excluding a labour subsidy. In both cases we consider an economy
without productivity shocks, i.e., we set a = a′ = 1. We assume that private consumption
is larger than labour income, as in the data. We also consider cases where depreciation is
tax-deductible and/or capital is fully utilised, i.e., v = v′ = 1. Importantly, under these240
assumption, the capital income tax is no longer distortionary within the period. The
details of the model with tax-deductible depreciation are in Appendix C. Our analytical
results characterise steady states.2
Result 1. Assume that the government has access to labour income, capital income, and con-
sumption taxation, and all tax rates are unrestricted. Then the Ramsey steady state with τc > 0,245
τc = −τh, and τk = 0 corresponds to the first best, and hence it is time-consistent. This holds in
our baseline model, when capital is fully utilised, and when depreciation is tax-deductible.
Proof. In Appendix B.
The government has only three instruments but faces four constraints. The first best
can nonetheless be achieved, because setting the capital tax to zero leaves both the Euler250
equation and capital utilisation undistorted.
2Here we are assuming (i) convergence of the allocations to an interior steady state and (ii) convergence
of the Lagrangian multipliers. As highlighted by Reinhorn (2014) and Straub and Werning (2018), these as-
sumptions are not innocuous in optimal taxation problems. However, our assumptions exclude cases with
diverging multipliers, see Straub and Werning (2018). Note also that when solving the model numerically,













We now turn to the case where a labour subsidy is excluded.
Result 2. When τh ≥ 0 is imposed, the Ramsey policy-maker taxes only consumption at the
steady state. This holds in our baseline model, when capital is fully utilised, and when depreciation
is tax-deductible.255
Proof. In Appendix B.
Coleman (2000) proves similar results in a framework without a balanced-budget re-
quirement (and with capital fully utilised and depreciation tax-deductible). In that case
and allowing for a labour subsidy, as in Result 1, constant taxes can be set over the transi-
tion period as well, hence the Ramsey planner can implement the first best in all periods.260
4. Quantitative analysis
We now turn to numerical methods and solve a calibrated version of our economy,
to assess quantitatively the optimal fiscal policy mix and welfare with and without con-
sumption taxation and with and without commitment.
4.1. Calibration265
We consider the model period to be a year and specify the utility function as
u (c, `, g) = log(c)− α`
(1− `)1+1/ϕ
1 + 1/ϕ
+ αg log(g), (16)
where ϕ is the (constant) Frisch elasticity of labour supply, while α` and αg are the weights
of leisure and public goods relative to private consumption, respectively. Given an in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1, we set the Frisch elasticity of labour sup-
ply, ϕ, equal to 3, as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), but we also check the robustness of our
results to a wide range of values of ϕ, 0.4 to 5, see below. We assume that the depreciation270
rate is an increasing and convex function of capital utilisation, following Greenwood et al.
(1988) and many others. That is, δ(v) = ηvχ, with η > 0 and χ > 1. Finally, we assume
that aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρ and
standard deviation of the shock σa.
To pin down β, γ, α`, η, and χ, we use the private sector’s first-order conditions275













United States data for the period 1996-2010. We take average capacity utilisation for all
industries from the Federal Reserve Board, and we compute all other macroeconomic ra-
tios using data provided by Trabandt and Uhlig (2012).3 The private sector takes as given
the effective tax rates. We use the effective tax rates computed by Trabandt and Uhlig280
(2012) for each year to find average tax rates of τh = 0.221, τc = 0.045, and τkδ = 0.410,
where the lower index δ means that this capital tax rate is with depreciation allowance.4
We target the average labour income share (60.9 percent), private consumption over GDP
(69.6 percent), public consumption over GDP (15.5 percent), capital over GDP (2.349), and
the fraction of time worked for the working age population (24.9 percent). To calibrate αg,285
we assume that g found in the data is optimally chosen in the sense that uc = ug. Finally,
we calibrate the AR(1) coefficients of the technological progress so that the unconditional
persistence and the standard deviation of total output in our economy with fixed tax rates
match that of de-trended US GDP for the period 1996-2010.
The calibrated parameter values are presented in Table 1.290
Table 1. Calibrated parameters
Par Value Description
ϕ 3 Frisch elasticity
β 0.943 Discount factor
α` 4.154 Weight of leisure
αg 0.223 Weight of public goods
γ 0.391 Capital elasticity
η 0.102
Depreciation parameters, δ(v) = ηvχ
χ 1.956
ρ 0.619 Technology shock autoregressive parameter
σa 0.020 Technology shock standard deviation
Note that we have not taken into account the household’s and the government’s bud-
get constraint. In reality tax revenues are raised not only to finance public consump-
tion, but also in order to redistribute resources from richer to poorer households. At
the status-quo steady state, tax revenues are higher by 11.7 percent of GDP than public
consumption. In order to satisfy the budget constraints, one can imagine that the govern-295
ment gives a lump-sum transfer of 11.7 percent of GDP to the representative household.
3https://sites.google.com/site/mathiastrabandt/home/downloads/LafferNberDataMatlabCode.zip
4We convert it to a capital tax rate without depreciation allowance, in line with our model, taking rev-
enue from capital income taxation as given. That is, τkδ (rv− δ(v)) = τkrv = τkγ
y














Viewed through the lens of a representative-agent model, this is a source of inefficiency
and will imply additional welfare gains for all optimal tax reforms.
4.2. Solution method
First, we solve the Ramsey problem using policy function iteration. This consists of300









stochastic case, we approximate the estimated AR(1) process by a 3-state Markov chain
following Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010) and Kopecky and Suen (2010). Once we
have found the endogenous collocation nodes, we guess the policy functions at each grid
point. At each iteration we solve the system of non-linear equations at each grid point,305
and we approximate globally the policy functions of next period using cubic splines.
Second, using the solution to the Ramsey problem by policy function iteration as ini-
tial guess, we solve it again parameterising the policy functions using cubic splines. Then,
we solve the time-consistent policy-maker’s problem in the same way. The derivatives of
next period’s policy functions with respect to the endogenous state k′ are computed using310
the Compecon Matlab package by Fackler and Miranda (2004). In this solution algorithm
we iterate until the parameters of the policy functions converge to high accuracy. The re-
sulting policy functions are well behaved. We use this algorithms to simulate the dynamic
paths of tax policies and allocations.5
4.3. Results315
In this section we first present the results for our baseline model, where the capi-
tal income tax is distortionary within the period, as well as results under alternative
assumptions. In particular, ee describe the steady state (Section 4.3.1) and the transi-
tion (Section 4.3.2), and we discuss our results with productivity shocks in Appendix D.
Section 4.3.3 summarises our robustness checks on parameter values, and Appendix E320
presents the results in details.
5We have also verified that alternative numerical methods give identical rates and allocations up to
many decimals: (i) we have used Chebyshev polynomials instead of cubic splines, and (ii) we have solved















Table 2 shows the allocations and the tax rates at steady state for five policy models.
Our first numerical result (displayed in the first column of Table 2) is that in the case
of unrestricted tax rates, while the policy-maker can implement the efficient allocation325
(see Result 1), the tax rates are unrealistic, with a consumption tax of 324.5 percent and a
labour income tax of -324.5 percent.
Table 2. Tax rates and allocations at steady state
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τc = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.221 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.065
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.198
Capital 1.801 1.548 1.539 1.467 1.106
Hours worked 0.320 0.275 0.277 0.261 0.283
Income 0.572 0.492 0.491 0.466 0.439
Consumption-income ratio 0.654 0.654 0.652 0.654 0.723
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.117
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.059 0.061 0.087 0.184
The second and main result is that if the government is prohibited from subsidising
labour, the consumption and capital tax rates implied by Ramsey and Markov policies
are remarkably similar. The Ramsey policy-maker (second column of Table 2) taxes con-330
sumption at 22.3 percent at the steady state and sets the labour and capital income taxes
to zero.6 The time-consistent policy-maker (third column) finances government spending
mainly from taxing consumption as well, taxing it at 22.1 percent, and sets the capital in-
come tax to 0.4 percent and the labour income tax to zero. Once a labour subsidy is ruled
out, it is inefficient to tax both labour and consumption, as both taxes distort the same335
margin, the consumption-leisure decision of the household. The policy-maker uses the
consumption tax, because it is less distortionary.
Taxing consumption is less distortionary than taxing labour for the following rea-
sons. First, note that, at the steady state, neither tax distorts intertemporal decisions,
6Note that the fact that the Ramsey policy-maker sets the consumption tax rate equal to αg when
τh ≥ 0, is a consequence of logarithmic sub-utilities for both private and government consumption. For
the same reason, the logarithmic sub-utilities for both private and government consumption implies that
the consumption-income ratio and the public spending-income ratio are the same in the Ramsey and the













only intratemporal ones. The consumption-leisure margin is distorted by the tax wedge340
ξ ≡ 1−τh1+τc , with ξ ≤ 1 as long as tax rates are non-negative. It is easy to see that for any tax
rate τ̃ > 0, ξ is closer to 1 when consumption rather than labour income is taxed. That is,
the same consumption tax distorts the consumption-leisure margin less than the labour
income tax. Note also that the difference in ξ increases with the tax rate τ̃. Relatedly, a 100
percent labour tax would imply that the economy shuts down, or, the labour tax Laffer345
curve peaks below 100 percent, while the economy would still function with a consump-
tion tax of 100 percent.7 In addition, as long as private consumption is larger than labour
income as a share of GDP, as in the data and in our calibrated model, then raising a given
amount of fiscal revenues requires a lower consumption tax rate than labour tax rate,
which magnifies the difference between the two instruments when it comes to distorting350
the household’s consumption-leisure choice.
As a direct consequence of the similarities in the tax rates in the two policy scenarios
when τh ≥ 0 is imposed, Ramsey and Markov steady states are remarkably similar in
terms of allocations and welfare. Capital and income are almost as high at the Markov
as at the Ramsey steady state. Likewise, the consumption- and public spending-income355
ratios change very little as a result of the change in commitment. Close-to-identical al-
locations imply that welfare changes little with commitment: the steady-state welfare-
equivalent consumption losses amount to 6.1 percent in the case of time-consistent policy
and to 5.9 percent under Ramsey compared to the first best. To summarise, with con-
sumption taxation the key feature of our steady-state results is that Ramsey and Markov360
policies, allocations, and welfare are very similar.
The third result is that without consumption taxation Ramsey and Markov steady
states are not similar. The Ramsey policy-maker (fourth column of Table 2) taxes only
labour income at the steady state (the Chamley-Judd result), while the time-consistent
policy-maker (fifth column) sets the labour income tax to 6.5 percent and the capital in-365
come tax to 19.8 percent. However, the tax rates strongly depend on the Frisch elastic-
ity of labour supply (ϕ = 3 in our baseline calibration) in this case, while not in the
other policy scenarios, see Section 4.3.3. Such distinct tax rates under the two commit-













ment scenarios imply that allocations and welfare differ significantly at the Ramsey and
Markov steady states. Compared with the Ramsey allocations, Markov policies imply370
significantly lower long-run capital and income, a higher consumption-income ratio, and
a lower public spending-income ratio, which are all due to more distortions caused by
taxation.8 Hours worked are higher under discretion than under commitment, because
of the lower labour income tax. The steady-state welfare-equivalent consumption losses
amount to 18.4 percent in the case of time-consistent policy and to 8.7 percent under Ram-375
sey. Interestingly we find that welfare is higher without commitment but with access to
consumption taxation than with commitment but taxing only labour and capital income.
4.3.2. Dynamics
In this section, we study whether our steady-state results on the usefulness of con-
sumption taxation in terms of mitigating the commitment problem of the policy-maker380
and improving welfare hold once we take into account transitional dynamics. Further, we
aim to shed light on the key trade-offs faced by the policy-makers during the transition.
In addition, we quantify for different taxation and commitment scenarios (i) the welfare
gains compared to the status quo, (ii) the gains from commitment, and (iii) the gains from
taxing consumption.385
In order to do this, we perform the following policy exercise. We assume that initially
the economy is at the status-quo steady state, described in Section 4.1. At time 1, a new
policy-maker enters into office. It can be either a Markov or a Ramsey policy-maker,
and with either access to consumption taxation or no access. Figures 1 and 2 show the
dynamics of tax rates and allocations without and with access to consumption taxation,390
respectively, for both Ramsey and Markov policy-makers.
The key result displayed in Figures 1 and 2 is that with access to consumption taxation
the whole dynamic paths of taxes and allocations hardly differ with and without commit-
ment, while they differ substantially when consumption is not taxed, as in Martin (2010)
and Debortoli and Nunes (2010). These results extend our second and third steady-state395
results.
8The result that the public spending-income ratio is lower under Markov policy was first noted by Klein













Figure 1. Ramsey and Markov policies without consumption taxation starting from the status quo
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Figure 2. Ramsey and Markov policies with consumption taxation and no labour subsidy starting from the
status quo
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The intuition behind our results is the following. First, consider the case without con-
sumption taxation. A high capital tax rate in the first few periods is partly levied on the
initial capital stock, which is a non-distortionary way to raise revenue. Our balanced-
budget assumption and the intratemporal distortion caused by the capital tax limit the400
initial capital levy in our environment, but it is still the key driver of policies in the first
few years. The Ramsey planner takes into account that the capital income tax in each (but
the first) period distorts the marginal rate of substitution between consumptions in differ-
ent time periods, as is well known. The desire of the policy-maker to avoid this distortion
is what drives long-run tax policies under commitment. In our environment, the govern-405
ment balances the above considerations with the distortions created by the capital income
tax on the capital utilisation rate and by the labour income tax on the consumption-leisure
margin. Variable capital utilisation modifies the calculation of the Ramsey government
only marginally compared to a standard setting with capital fully utilised. The policy-
maker raises the capital income tax less in the initial period and makes a greater use of410
the labour income tax.
The time-consistent policy-maker differs in not internalising the impact of the current
capital income tax on past consumptions, and the desire to tax the ‘initial’ capital stock
plays a key role. The Markov policy-maker balances these considerations with only the
intratemporal distortions caused by the two tax instruments. This leads to dramatic dif-415
ferences in policies and allocations between Ramsey and Markov governments.
On the contrary, taxing consumption partly taxes the initial capital stock as well. Fur-
ther, a time-constant consumption tax does not distort intertemporal decisions, while the
capital income tax does (except for period 1). Moreover, in our framework with endoge-
nous capital utilisation, the initial capital tax distorts capital utilisation, while the con-420
sumption tax distorts the consumption-leisure margin. This last distortion turns out to be
the least important quantitatively in determining optimal policy. The distortion that the
capital income tax causes within the period, combined with fact that the consumption tax
is partially levied on initial capital, imply that it is optimal to raise most fiscal revenue by
taxing consumption, including in the initial period. Then, the time-inconsistency features425













rium with consumption taxation follows from the Ramsey case. At the Markov equilib-
rium in every period the trade-offs are as in the initial period of the Ramsey equilibrium,
hence fiscal revenue is raised mainly by taxing consumption by the Markov government
as well in all periods.430
Using our simulation results above, one can compute the welfare gains in terms of
welfare-equivalent consumption from the different taxation and commitment scenarios
compared to the existing tax system. In the case of a Ramsey policy-maker, the wel-
fare gains are 7.745 percent and 7.06 percent with and without taxing consumption, re-
spectively. Ceteris paribus, in the case of a Markov policy-maker, the welfare gains are435
7.744 percent and 4.92 percent, respectively. Notice that the welfare gains are larger with
consumption taxation and without commitment than without consumption taxation and
with commitment. The fact that welfare gains in the Ramsey and Markov cases are almost
identical follows from the close similarity of tax policies and allocations.
We also quantify the welfare gains from commitment both with and without consump-440
tion taxation, starting from the corresponding Markov steady state. The welfare gains
from commitment are 0.0003 percent with consumption taxation and 2.01 percent taxing
labour income instead. Hence, the gains from commitment are negligible with access to
consumption taxation, while they are substantial without. Finally, the gains from taxing
consumption without (with) commitment are 2.77 (1.21) percent, taking into account the445
transition from the Markov (Ramsey) steady state without consumption taxation. Hence,
the welfare gains from taxing consumption are much larger under discretion than under
commitment.
Table 3 summarises our welfare results including transitions.
Table 3. Welfare gains in welfare-equivalent consumption (percent)
Welfare gains... With cons. tax Without cons. tax
...from commitment 0.0003 2.01
...compared to the existing tax system ...from taxing consumption
Ramsey 7.745 7.06 1.21














In this section we show that our main result, that Ramsey and Markov equilibria are
close to identical with consumption taxation, is robust to modifying parameter values
and to assuming that government spending is exogenous rather than endogenous.
First of all, we consider a wide range of values for the Frisch elasticity of labour sup-
ply: (i) ϕ = 0.4, which is in line with recent micro estimates such as Domeij and Floden455
(2006) (see also Guner et al., 2012), (ii) ϕ = 1, which is often chosen in the macro literature
(e.g. Christiano et al., 2005), and (iii) ϕ = 5 as a high value, which is sometimes chosen
to better match the intertemporal variation of aggregate hours (e.g. Galı́ et al., 2007). We
adjust α` appropriately in each case as described in Section 4.1. The steady-state results
for all policy scenarios are in the first three panels of Table E.7. The change in ϕ only460
affects tax rates and allocations without consumption taxation and without commitment.
In that case, as ϕ increases from 0.4 to 5, τh decreases from 17.3 to 4.2 percent and τk in-
creases from 7.8 to 22.1 percent. This is because increasing the elasticity of labour supply
increases the distortion caused by τh compared to τk. With ϕ = 1 we recover the result of
the existing literature (Martin, 2010; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010) that the two income tax465
rates are near-equal at the Markov steady state.
It is also worth noting that under discretion as ϕ increases, the public spending-income
ratio decreases with only factor income taxation, but hardly changes with consumption
taxation. This is because the Markov planner chooses lower taxes as the distortionary
effects of fiscal policy are greater. Note, however, that a higher Frisch elasticity implies470
larger welfare losses compared to the first best under all four policy scenarios. This is
because, ceteris paribus, a higher ϕ implies a stronger response of hours to any given
distortion of the consumption-leisure margin.
We have verified that our conclusions are robust to various other parameter changes.
We have considered (i) a coefficient of relative risk aversion for private consumption equal475
to 2 (in this case we have recalibrated the utility weights α` = 16.791 and αg = 0.050 to
keep hours at 0.249 and g/y at 0.155 before the reform), (ii) β = 0.96, the most commonly
used value in the macro literature for yearly models, (iii) χ = 1.8 and adjust η = 0.098 so













implies a depreciation rate of 0.076 at the steady state), and (iv) αg = 0.3, which reduces480
the consumption tax base compared to the baseline. The steady-state results in all these
scenarios and in panels four to seven of Table E.7.
Remarkably, under all parameterisations considered, taxing consumption is more im-
portant than being able to commit. As reported in Tables 2 and E.7, welfare is always
higher under Markov policy-making and consumption taxation than under Ramsey with-485
out taxing consumption.
Finally, we assume that government spending is exogenous. The new policy problem
consists of raising fiscal revenues in order to finance an exogenous and fixed level of
























































We calibrate ḡ so that ḡ/y at steady state, given the status-quo tax rates, is equal to its value
in the data, 0.155. Then we keep ḡ constant across all policy regimes. All other parameters
are kept at their benchmark values as described in Section 4.1. The steady-state results of
this exercise are reported in Table E.8. The close similarity of Ramsey and Markov policies490
and allocations when consumption is taxed optimally holds in this case as well.
5. On capital utilisation, the tax-deductibility of depreciation, and budget balance
In this section we discuss the role of three key assumptions adopted in our model,
namely, (i) variable capital utilisation, (ii) non-tax-deductibility of depreciation, and (iii)
the balanced-budget requirement imposed on the government.495
In order to highlight the role of the first two key assumptions, we solve our model
under three alternative sets of assumptions: full (instead of variable) capital utilisation,
or tax-deductible (instead of non-tax-deductible) depreciation, or both. The key feature
in all three alternative settings is that the capital income tax is no longer distortionary













are no longer close to identical.
The literature has studied the case where capital taxation is non-distortionary within
the period without consumption taxation. In particular, Klein et al. (2008) assume that
capital is fully utilised and show that, if the labour income tax rate has to be non-negative,
then only capital is taxed at the Markov solution in all periods. Martin (2010) allows for505
a labour subsidy and shows that no Markov-perfect equilibrium exists for standard cal-
ibrations when the capital tax is non-distortionary within the period. See also Debortoli
and Nunes (2010). More precisely, for any given rate of time preference, a Markov-perfect
equilibrium exists only if the preference for the public good is low enough, much lower
than in standard calibrations. This is because the Markov government wants to tax capital510
and subsidise labour, and ends up confiscating the whole capital stock, hence the econ-
omy shuts down (Martin, 2010). Therefore, below we present results with consumption
taxation but not without.
5.1. Full capital utilisation
First we analyse the case where capital is fully utilised. To do this, we set v = 1 and515
λ4 = 0 in all periods. The first two columns of Table 4 present, respectively, the Ramsey
and Markov steady-state results with consumption taxation in this case. Figure 3 presents
the dynamic paths of policies and allocations.
Table 4. Tax rates and allocations at steady state, alternative assumptions
non-tax-ded. δ, v = 1 tax-ded. δ, variable v tax-ded. δ, v = 1
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax rate 0.223 0.160 0.223 0.156 0.223 0.160
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.236
Capital 1.215 1.031 1.548 1.144 1.215 1.031
Hours worked 0.288 0.292 0.275 0.287 0.288 0.292
Income 0.505 0.478 0.492 0.473 0.505 0.478
Consumption-income ratio 0.618 0.638 0.654 0.654 0.618 0.638
Public spending-income ratio 0.138 0.142 0.146 0.146 0.138 0.142
We first discuss the Ramsey equilibrium. The key difference from our baseline model
is a higher capital tax in the first few years. The lack of intratemporal distortion caused520
by capital taxation creates an incentive for the Ramsey planner to tax capital at a higher













the fact that this tax instrument is partly levied on the initial capital stock as well. Capital
income taxes converge to zero, while consumption taxes increase during the transition to
satisfy the government’s budget constraint. The paths of allocations are similar to those525
in our baseline model.
Turning to the Markov equilibrium, first of all, it exists. This follows from what hap-
pens at the Ramsey equilibrium in the initial period. Consumption is taxed rather than
subsidised optimally, and the capital income tax is not confiscatory, for our standard cali-
bration. The same is true in each period when policies are time-consistent.530
Contrary to our baseline model, the capital income tax rate is not close to zero at the
steady state, instead it is 10.3 percent. Consumption is taxed at approximately 16 percent
in all periods. As such, this tax component remains an important source of revenues even
when capital is fully utilised. However, compared to its Ramsey counterpart, Markov-
perfect taxation inhibits capital accumulation significantly.535
Finally, we highlight the welfare gains compared to the existing tax system, and from
being able to commit, see the first column of Table 5. Our baseline results are weakened
Figure 3. Ramsey and Markov policies with consumption taxation and no labour subsidy starting from the
status quo, full capital utilisation
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if capital is fully utilised. The gain from commitment is 0.338 percent with full capital
utilisation, compared to 0.0003 at baseline.
Table 5. Welfare gains in welfare-equivalent consumption (percent), alternative assumptions
Welfare gains... non-tax-ded. δ, v = 1 tax-ded. δ, variable v tax-ded. δ, v = 1
...from commitment 0.338 0.633 0.338
...compared to the existing tax system
Ramsey 6.816 7.793 6.816
Markov 6.447 7.709 6.447
5.2. Tax-deductible depreciation540
Now we consider the case where depreciation is tax-deductible and capital utilisation
is endogenous. Appendix C contains the model setup and the Ramsey and Markov
policy problems for this case. Tax rates and allocations at the steady state are presented in
the third and fourth columns of Table 4, Figure 4 shows the dynamic paths, and welfare
is reported in the second column of Table 5.545
There are several differences compared to the case with full capital utilisation. First,
capital income taxes are higher in the Markov equilibrium (23.1 percent at the steady
state). This is due to the fact that with depreciation allowance, the capital income tax
base is smaller, thus creating the need of a higher rate for a given level of fiscal revenues.
Second, capital is significantly higher, but income is similar, given that capital is not fully550
utilised. Finally, the welfare gains from commitment are larger in this case (0.633 percent),
even further from our baseline result.
5.3. Full capital utilisation and tax-deductible depreciation
Finally, we assume that capital is fully utilised and depreciation is tax-deductible. That
is, we set v = 1 and λ4 = 0 in the model of Appendix C. Tax rates and allocations at the555
steady state are presented in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 4 and welfare is reported
in last column of Table 5. The results are identical to the case where depreciation is not
tax-deductible and capital is fully utilised, except for the capital income tax rate at the
Markov steady state (23.6 percent). The difference compared to Section 5.1 is due to the
difference in tax bases, as with variable capital utilisation. We do not include a separate560
figure of the dynamic paths of tax rates and allocations, as they look identical to those of













Figure 4. Ramsey and Markov policies with consumption taxation and no labour subsidy starting from the
status quo, with depreciation allowance
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Compared to all scenarios we have considered, one difference remains between our
model and that of Coleman (2000): We have assumed throughout that the government has565
to balance its budget, while Coleman (2000) allows for government debt under commit-
ment. Solving our policy problems with both capital and government debt is beyond the
scope of this paper, as well as of the literature on Markov-perfect policies, to our knowl-
edge. Nonetheless, we can compare our Ramsey setting with consumption taxation, full
capital utilisation, and tax-deductible depreciation to that of Coleman (2000). Then the570
only remaining difference concerns the government’s budget.9
To avoid trivial solutions to the public finance problem, instead of budget balance,
Coleman (2000) imposes upper bounds on the initial capital income tax rate (50 or 100
percent). Then the consumption tax becomes a very useful instrument to impose an initial
capital levy, and hence the government can reduce its debt or accumulate assets. For575
example, with an upper bound of 100 percent on the capital income tax, Coleman (2000)













finds an initial consumption tax of 117 percent. This motive is not strong in our setting
with budget balance, and the consumption tax follows as increasing path, see Figure 3.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have considered a representative-agent framework, hence we stud-580
ied the optimal tax mix from an efficiency perspective only. An important task for fu-
ture research is to analyse the distributional impact of different tax instruments with and
without commitment in a model with heterogeneous households. In addition, we have
imposed a balanced-budget requirement on the policy-maker. In a recent paper, Debor-
toli et al. (2017) allow for debt in a Markov-perfect policy setting, but they exclude capital,585
and the only tax instrument available to the government is a labour income tax. The study
of tax policy trade-offs in the presence of debt when the government cannot commit is an-
other interesting avenue for future investigation.
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Appendix A. Analytical characterisations









the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint, (10), when history at has occurred.





































































































































































































































































Straightforward combinations of (A.1)-(A.8) lead to the following equations which char-








































































































































and the productivity process given.645
Appendix A.2. Constraints of the policy problems













) and four equations ((7), (8),(9), and (3)) are








































































































































































which is (12) in the main text.
Then, we use the household’s intratemporal optimality condition (A.16), and the gov-



































































































































































v (at) k (at−1)
, (A.24)
which is (14) in the main text.
Appendix A.3. First-order conditions of the Ramsey policy-maker’s problem
We assume that the utility function is separable with respect to its three arguments,650
hence the second cross-derivatives are zero.




























































































































aγ (1− γ) (vk)γ h−γ−1,








































































































0 = `+ h− 1, (A.32)
0 = c + g + kt+1 − a (vk)γ h1−γ − (1− δ (v)) k, (A.33)






























































Appendix A.4. First-order conditions of the time-consistent policy-maker’s problem


































































(1− γ) γa (vk)γ h−γ−1, (A.40)
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Plugging this condition into (A.42), we obtain
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Finally, the first-order conditions with respect to λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, and λ5, respectively, are
0 = `+ h− 1, (A.44)
0 = c + g + k′ − a (vk)γ h1−γ − (1− δ (v)) k, (A.45)
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λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness conditions.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Result 1. Consider first the case where capital is fully utilised, i.e., v = 1. Be-660
side the technological constraints, i.e., the time constraint (2) and the resource constraint
(12), which constrain the first best as well, the government faces only three constraints: its
budget constraint plus the Euler and consumption-leisure optimality condition of house-
holds. Given a constant τc at the steady state, comparing (A.12) and (A.34) gives τk = 0.
Also, comparing (A.10) and (A.16) gives 1−τ
h
1+τc = 1, hence τ
c = −τh. Finally, as long665
as consumption is larger than labour income, the only way to raise revenue to finance g
is by setting τc > 0. In the case where households choose the capital utilisation rate, the
policy-maker has to satisfy an additional incentive constraint, (A.18), while it has no more
instruments. However, given that τk = 0, the capital utilisation margin is not distorted,
hence the first-best steady state can still be implemented. In addition, it is well known670
that when a Ramsey equilibrium attains the first best, it is time-consistent. A similar
argument can be made with tax-deductible depreciation.
Proof of Result 2. Consider our baseline framework first, i.e., endogenous capital utilisa-
tion and non-tax-deductible depreciation. By the usual Kuhn-Tucker argument, if (A.36)
is not satisfied when it is ignored, we can impose it as equality, hence τh = 0. Next, note
that at the steady state combining (A.34) and (A.36) as equality gives
1
β





































Now, from (A.29) λ2 − λ3 uc1+τc 1k − λ4 1vk = ug > 0, hence g = τcc if λ5 = 0. Finally, from





= λ2w, which says that the marginal value
of leisure relative to consumption is the real wage, which obviously holds. Now, with675
v = 1 and λ4 = 0 and/or with tax-deductible depreciation it easy to see that the above
argument still holds.
Appendix C. With tax-deductible depreciation
We focus on the deterministic case (and drop aggregate productivity a from the equa-
tions to simplify), and use the notation of the recursive version of our model. We assume680
that the capital tax is levied on (rv− δ (v)) k, i.e., (actual) depreciation is tax-deductible.
Appendix C.1. Environment and policy problems
The description of the economy is modified as follows. The government’s and the
household’s budget constraints are, respectively,
g = τk (rv− δ (v)) k + τhwh + τcc,








wh + (1− δ (v)) k.
The private sector’s optimality conditions change as follows. The labour income tax can
be expressed from the household’s consumption-leisure FOC as in (A.21), as before, and
we can express the capital income tax from the government’s budget constraint as
τk =


















































































that is, the Euler is unchanged. Finally, the first-order condition with respect to v now is






hence capital income taxation is not distortionary within the period.
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λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness conditions.
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λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness conditions.685
Appendix C.2. First-order conditions of the Ramsey policy-maker’s problem






















































































− λ4γ(1− γ)h−γ(vk)γ−1 − λ5
1
1 + τc
γ (1− γ) (vk)γ h−γ−1, (C.4)














































































0 = `+ h− 1, (C.8)
0 = c + g + kt+1 − (vk)γ h1−γ − (1− δ (v)) k, (C.9)









































λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness condition.













Appendix C.3. First-order conditions of the time-consistent policy-maker’s problem





























− λ4γ(1− γ)h−γ(vk)γ−1 − λ5
1
1 + τc
(1− γ) γ (vk)γ h−γ−1,
(C.16)
0 = ug − λ2, (C.17)















































































































Finally, the first-order conditions with respect to λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, and λ5, respectively, are
0 = `+ h− 1, (C.19)
0 = c + g + k′ − (vk)γ h1−γ − (1− δ (v)) k, (C.20)
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λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness condition.690
When capital is fully utilised, we set v = 1 and λ4 = 0, and ignore (C.18) and (C.22).
Appendix D. Response to aggregate productivity shocks
We now study the cyclical properties of policy instruments and allocations. We are
interested in whether the close similarity between Ramsey and Markov policies when
consumption is taxed optimally still holds when the economy faces aggregate productiv-695
ity shocks. For each policy scenario, we simulate the model and calculate sample statistics
from the simulated data.10 The results of this exercise for our baseline calibration are re-
ported in Table D.6. We have also solved the stochastic model with ϕ = 1 to check the
robustness of the cyclical properties of tax rates and allocations. The main features remain
unchanged. The results are available upon request.700
When consumption taxes are not available and the policy-maker can credibly commit,
we recover the well-known labour tax smoothing result of the Ramsey literature (Chari
et al., 1994). Under discretion, the policy-maker uses both capital and labour income
taxes in response to unexpected productivity changes. This is due to the fact that the
Markov policy-maker is less able to smooth the effects of random productivity events in-705
tertemporally, as it is less able to use the capital income tax as shock absorber, given that
it relies heavily on this instrument to raise fiscal revenue. The volatility of output and
hours worked are slightly higher under commitment than under discretion, while the
opposite is true for private and public consumption. Finally, both tax rates are counter-
cyclical. These patterns are, for the most part, very similar to the ones presented in Klein710
and Rı́os-Rull (2003) and in Debortoli and Nunes (2010), although the class of economies
they look at is slightly different. In particular, Klein and Rı́os-Rull (2003) study a model
with full capital utilisation, exogenous government spending, and a capital income tax
which is determined one or more periods in advance, while Debortoli and Nunes (2010)
consider a utility function with variable Frisch elasticity of labour supply.715
The differences between Ramsey and Markov policies are greatly reduced when the
policy-maker can tax consumption. As in the case without consumption taxation, under
commitment the coefficient of variation of capital income taxes is larger than that of the
alternative tax instrument, in this case, the consumption tax. However, under Markov
10We proceed as follows. We assume that in the initial period the system is in its stochastic steady state.
We simulate the model for 1000 periods, using the same shocks across policy scenarios, and compute sample













Table D.6. Cyclical properties of taxes and allocations
τh ≥ 0 τc = 0
Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax Labour income tax
Mean 0.223 0.221 0.240 0.065
Standard deviation 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002
Coefficient of variation 0.021 0.019 0.009 0.026
Autocorrelation 0.609 0.640 0.922 0.507
Correlation with output 0.9998 0.996 -0.700 -0.853
Capital income tax
Mean 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.198
Standard deviation 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.003
Coefficient of variation 10.807 1.699 30.693 0.017
Autocorrelation 0.609 0.638 0.463 0.504
Correlation with output -0.9995 -0.996 -0.801 -0.909
Public spending
Mean 0.072 0.072 0.068 0.051
Standard deviation 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Coefficient of variation 0.013 0.013 0.019 0.020
Autocorrelation 0.976 0.976 0.776 0.809
Correlation with output 0.400 0.431 0.880 0.886
Public spending-income ratio
Mean 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.117
Standard deviation 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002
Coefficient of variation 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.020
Autocorrelation 0.521 0.524 0.514 0.504
Correlation with output -0.894 -0.893 -0.936 -0.885
Consumption
Mean 0.322 0.322 0.305 0.317
Standard deviation 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
Coefficient of variation 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.016
Autocorrelation 0.976 0.976 0.939 0.935
Correlation with output 0.400 0.431 0.621 0.675
Hours
Mean 0.275 0.276 0.261 0.283
Standard deviation 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006
Coefficient of variation 0.018 0.018 0.027 0.022
Autocorrelation 0.524 0.527 0.513 0.503
Correlation with output 0.859 0.856 0.936 0.895
Output
Mean 0.492 0.492 0.467 0.439
Standard deviation 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.016
Coefficient of variation 0.030 0.030 0.042 0.036
Autocorrelation 0.603 0.607 0.570 0.597













policies capital taxes still play the main role in absorbing shocks, as opposed to without720
consumption taxation. A new feature of tax policies with consumption taxation is that the
consumption tax rate is highly procyclical. The capital income tax rate remains counter-
cyclical, but its correlation with output increases when consumption is taxed. Consump-
tion, public spending, hours, and output all vary less with consumption taxation than
without.725
Finally, we compute long-run expected welfare as a percentage increase in welfare-
equivalent consumption in all periods and all states in a particular policy scenario that
is necessary to make the representative household as well off as at the first best.11 The
values are very similar to those for the deterministic steady state. Therefore, the business
cycle results confirm the similarities between Ramsey and Markov equilibria when the730
policy-maker has access to consumption taxation, as well as the welfare benefits of taxing
consumption.
11In order to do this, for some percentage increase in consumption ε, we simulate the economy over 600
periods, compute per-period utility for the last 500 periods, and finally take the average over 501 such
simulations. Then we find the ε such that the average per-period utility matches the one found for the first













Appendix E. Robustness checks
Table E.7. Tax rates and allocations at steady state with alternative parameter values
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τc = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
ϕ = 0.4
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.221 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.173
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.078
Capital 1.553 1.466 1.459 1.436 1.273
Hours worked 0.276 0.261 0.261 0.255 0.259
Income 0.494 0.466 0.465 0.457 0.439
Consumption 0.323 0.305 0.305 0.300 0.298
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.136
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.022 0.023 0.032 0.069
ϕ = 1
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.220 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.125
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.133
Capital 1.648 1.490 1.480 1.437 1.181
Hours worked 0.293 0.265 0.265 0.256 0.265
Income 0.524 0.474 0.472 0.457 0.433
Consumption 0.343 0.310 0.310 0.299 0.302
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.128
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.039 0.041 0.058 0.119
ϕ = 5
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.221 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.042
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.221
Capital 1.887 1.595 1.588 1.502 1.099
Hours worked 0.336 0.284 0.284 0.267 0.295
Income 0.600 0.507 0.506 0.477 0.449
Consumption 0.392 0.332 0.332 0.312 0.329
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.112













Tax rates and allocations at steady state with alternative parameter values (continued)
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τc = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
σ = 2
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.234 0.224 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.253 0.099
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.197
Capital 1.522 1.402 1.380 1.358 1.015
Hours worked 0.271 0.249 0.250 0.242 0.259
Income 0.484 0.446 0.443 0.432 0.402
Consumption 0.317 0.289 0.289 0.279 0.282
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.152 0.150 0.154 0.137
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.031 0.035 0.046 0.147
β = 0.96
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.222 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.059
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.202
Capital 3.352 2.882 2.872 2.719 2.039
Hours worked 0.322 0.277 0.277 0.261 0.283
Income 0.732 0.629 0.628 0.593 0.557
Consumption 0.479 0.412 0.411 0.388 0.404
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.115
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.059 0.060 0.088 0.187
χ = 1.8
Consumption tax rate 4.628 0.223 0.223 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -4.628 0.000 0.000 0.234 0.081
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.0004 0.000 0.172
Capital 1.669 1.435 1.434 1.366 1.071
Hours worked 0.326 0.280 0.280 0.267 0.285
Income 0.583 0.502 0.502 0.478 0.452
Consumption 0.373 0.321 0.321 0.306 0.318
Public spending-income ratio 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.117
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.0560 0.0562 0.081 0.157
αg = 0.3
Consumption tax rate 29.558 0.300 0.297 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -29.558 0.000 0.000 0.303 0.081
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.233
Capital 1.885 1.548 1.537 1.438 1.032
Hours worked 0.335 0.275 0.276 0.256 0.284
Income 0.599 0.492 0.491 0.457 0.428
Consumption 0.369 0.303 0.303 0.281 0.302
Public spending-income ratio 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.141













Table E.8. Tax rates and allocations at steady state with exogenous government spending
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τc = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax rate 1.179 0.167 0.165 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -1.179 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.078
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.211
Capital 1.718 1.548 1.541 1.467 1.077
Hours worked 0.306 0.275 0.276 0.261 0.283
Income 0.546 0.492 0.491 0.466 0.434
Consumption 0.381 0.337 0.337 0.305 0.309
Public spending-income ratio 0.103 0.115 0.115 0.121 0.130
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.088
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